The Federalist Project – #3

The Federalist Project
Federalist No. 3

Jay

3 November, 1787

The third Federalist, as the second, is composed by John Jay.  This essay is more squarely in J’s wheelhouse, as it deals with the advantages of Union (again, almost always capitalized) vis-à-vis foreign affairs; and to a lesser extent vis-à-vis internal stability.  The essay is more firmly grounded in the real world, rather than theory, and is, in my opinion, the stronger for it.  As in my previous essay, we will proceed through his arguments paragraph by paragraph, beginning with the first:

 

  • “It is not a new observation that the people of any country (if like the Americans intelligent and well informed) seldom adopt, and steadily preserve for many years in, an erroneous opinion respecting their interests.”
    • Oh, I wouldn’t be so sure…
    • Anyway, J opens again with a ‘we can all agree’ position.
  • “…the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one Fœderal Government…”
    • ipso facto: “intelligent and well informed” people don’t keep bad opinions for long; Americans are “intelligent and well informed” and have had this opinion for a while…therefore it must be right and good.

 

In the third Paragraph, J introduces the main theme of the essay: Safety:

  • “Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first.”
    • There’s something interesting going on here. J stipulates that the people must first be “free.”  That is, “safety” can’t be addressed until independence (in this case from Britain) is secured.  However, it strikes me that this argument cuts both ways.  For surely, the opposition would view themselves as being ‘unfree’ under one (in their eyes) too-powerful Fœderal Government, and would themselves be in no position to address their own (and ‘sovereign’) “safety.”
    • Be that as it may, J will, in the the next paragraph, define safety “precisely and comprehensively.”

 

Paragraph Four sets out that definition:

  • “At present I mean only to consider it [i.e. safety] as it respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquility, as well as against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers of the like kind arising from domestic causes.”
    • Now J moves into an area where he can, and does, speak with greater clarity and authority – real world policies (opp. theory). As we will see, his reasoning is largely based on history and practical experience as well as America’s current geo-political relationships.
  • “…a cordial Union under an efficient national Government, affords them [the people] the best security that can be advised against hostilities from abroad.”
    • In Fed.2.2 (and echoing Rousseau), J writes: “the people must cede to it [the Government] some of their natural rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers.” Here, he is essentially substituting the States for the People.  For, as we will see, his arguments all revolve around the efficiency of the Union in these matters, as opposed to the thirteen States or three or four confederacies.

 

Paragraph Five addresses advantages of Union with respect to the causes of war:

  • “The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world, will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether real or pretended, which provoke or invite
    • I suppose this is more or less true, if a bit circular. But more interesting – to me, anyway – is that this is another example of J beginning an argument with what he posits to be a universal truth, or at least, a universally agreed upon principle.  It seems, at those early stage, to be a marker of his rhetorical style.
  • “…it becomes useful to enquire, whether so many just causes of war are likely to be given by United America, as by disunited America…”
    • Now we embark upon one of the two main arguments of this essay: that Union will better promote peace and security on the international stage.
    • On an orthographic level, what, if any, is the significance of capitals and italics for “United America” v. non-italic, lower case “disunited” (and not “America”)? Does he mean to imply that one is more legitimate – more “proper,” so to speak – than the other?  Or am I reading too much into it?
  • “…for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the fewest [just causes of war], then it will follow that, in this respect, the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.”
    • “Useful to enquire,” “if it should turn out”: A change in rhetorical style here. Now he proceeds from inquiry, thesis.  In the following paragraphs, he will set out to prove these.

 

Paragraph Six sees J leave theory behind and enter the upon the ‘real world’ with special attention to America’s actual relationships with other powers in the real of geo-politics.  Nor should we forget J’s experience as a diplomat, which lends weight and expertise to his arguments and analyses.

  • “The just causes of war for the most part arise either from violation of treaties, or from direct violence.”
    • I read this as simple analysis rather than the rhetorical ‘first principles’ we have previously seen.
  • “America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to injure us…”
    • This information is no doubt as useful to the modern reader as to the contemporary.
  • “She also has extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and with respect to the two latter, has in addition the circumstances of neighborhood to attend to.”
    • Somewhat tangentially, perhaps, J reminds the reader that not only are war and peace at stake, but trade and commerce as well; surely no small thing for the sate of New York in particular, to whom these essays are, after all, primarily addressed.
    • “Neighborhood”: I assume, Spanish Florida and British Canada, as well as the various holdings of both states in the Caribbean. That he does not identify these means, presumably, he well expects the reader to know exactly what he means.
      • This may contradict my earlier note about separation/protection by ocean (cf. Fed.2.4). For if the Spanish are in Florida and the Brits in Canada; and both in the Caribbean, than perhaps the Atlantic is not so great a barrier and protection as I previously allowed; even if it is not wholly insignificant.

 

We the readers – both modern and contemporary – tend to focus our analyses of the Federalist essays and the debate over adoption of the constitution on how empowered the federal government should be.  But in Paragraph Seven, J reminds us that America’s legitimacy on the international stage was very much at stake here:

  • “It is of high importance to the peace of America, that she observe the laws of nations towards all these Powers…”

 

In Paragraph Eight, J argues that one national government will necessarily lead to the election and appointment of the best people and those most suited to manage national affairs (as opposed to local), both foreign and domestic:

  • “Because when once the efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve; but also be generally appointed to manage it…”
    • So much to unpack here. First, “men” only and white men at that.  Second, it’s optimistic, although perhaps not unfairly so.  After all, the quality of the members of the Continental Congress and the Convention was at an extremely high level.  But is it unfair to think that this was a time when much greater emphasis was placed on public service?  Furthermore, those assemblies may have been the greatest collection of minds in our history.  Is it naïve to think such constellations would be easily repeated?  I don’t’ know.  In any case, it does seem that today, our best minds do not go into public service.
  • “…for altho’ town our country, or other contracted influence may place men in state assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments; yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications, will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government…”
    • Again, I don’t know if this reasonably optimistic or foolishly naïve. Additionally, I wonder now how one is able to acquire “more general and extensive reputation” outside of military service.  Outside of the one-time initial Continental Congress, must not all politicians make their names locally before they can aspire to national office?
  • “…especially as it will have the widest field of choice, and never experience the want of proper persons, which is not uncommon in some of the States.”
    • Even if this can be said to be generally true – and I’m not sure that it can – it is certainly not nearly always true, as the election of 2016 made painfully clear.
  • “Hence it will result, that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national Government will be more wise, systematical and judicious, than those of the States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more safe with respect to us.”
    • But this has not always been true. Sometimes the national Government is “more wise [etc.]” than the States (e.g. Brown v. Board of Education).  But sometimes states take the lead (e.g. California with environmental standards).  And even on the international stage, it is now states (and cities) which must take the lead on environmental issues after national withdrawal from the Paris agreements.
    • Earlier, I mentioned military service as a way to gain “general and extensive reputation.” It occurs to me hat success in business is another avenue.  But in our history, businessmen have tended to stay in business, while politicians seem to run a sort of cursus honorum beginning at the local level.  But perhaps this is a post-industrial view?  Hancock and Jefferson were both ‘businessmen,’ albeit of very different sorts.  And Adams would have gained national notoriety as a lawyer for defending the accused in the Boston Massacre.  But in modern times, names like Perot and Trump come to mind, and I don’t think either can be said to have been (or be) successful, despite the latter’s electoral victory; certainly not in the ways that J here describes.

 

In Paragraph Nine, J addresses the efficacy of “committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by, and responsible only to one national Government.”  Such questions include:

  • “…treaties and articles of treaties…”
  • “…laws of nations…”
    • The importance of doing so “cannot be too much commended.”

 

Paragraph Ten continues to present the advantages of one national government:

  • “Because the prospect of present loss or advantage, may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice; but those temptations not reaching the other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved.”
    • This is a very sound argument, I think. Thirteen states acting under one federal government should, in theory, only arrive at decisions which benefit the nation as a whole, even if certain aspects of a treaty may be found to be harmful to a particular state or region.  Perhaps the nature of trade or relations with England or France might be examples of this.
  • “The case of the treaty of peace with Britain, adds great weight to this reasoning.”
    • Though this is surely right, J is hardly a disinterested party here, having been a principal negotiator in that treaty. But this, I think, serves to lend weight and expertise to the argument.

 

Paragraph Eleven paints the proposed national government as a counterbalance to the “temptations” and jealousies of local and regional politics.  And while the two-party system had yet to manifest itself, it is easy to read this paragraph as presenting the proposed national government as a counterbalance to the “temptations” and jealousies of party politics as well:

  • “Because even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and my affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able if wiling to prevent the injustice mediated, or to punish the aggressors.”
    • And now J returns to theory, where I have so far felt him less strong. In nay case, while this may be true to an extent of the “governing party,” nevertheless, it has not seemed to hinder the independent judiciary.  If we take NY as an example, the state Attorneys General have shown themselves equal to the task of taking on members of their own party as well as of the opposition.  And this has been no less true of the Federal prosecutors (e.g. Preet Bharara).
  • “But the national Government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent, or punish its commission by others.”
    • I’m not sure that the national government isn’t affected by “local circumstances,” first of all. But let us stipulate this for the sake of argument.  I find the notion that the national government wouldn’t be “induced to commit the wrong” somewhat laughable.  And when those wrongs do happen on the national level, it is here, I think, that politicians have shown themselves least willing to go after members of their own party.  Indeed, they seem all too ready to defend the wrongdoers – and indeed the wrongs themselves – in the interest of protecting the “brand.”  But perhaps this is too modern, too current, a view.  And if so, should J be held to be in the wrong on this account?

 

Taking Paragraphs Twelve & Thirteen together, we say J return to the causes of war:

  • (12) “So far therefore as either designed or accidental violation of treaties and of laws of nations afford just causes for war…the former [i.e. “one general government”] most favors the safety of the people.”
  • (13) “As to those causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence…one good national government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort, than can be derived from any other quarter.”
    • ¶12 is based on his arguments in ¶11, which read to me as being more relevant to domestic concerns. I do not alter my commentary however, where we might cite Benghazi as an example of the politicization of an external matter on the one hand, and defense of torture on the other.  Though the decision to go to war in Iraq was blundered into on both sides, which shows that one “general government” is hardly infallible or incapable of giving “just causes” of war.  But perhaps this is more relevant to ¶13-14.
    • As ¶12 depends on ¶11, by a sort of chiasmus does ¶13 depend upon ¶14…

 

Paragraph 14 sees J attempt to show that one national government could hardly be expected to give “unjust causes” for war:

  • “Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and interests of a part than the whole, of one or two States than of the Union.”
    • He may be right here, when the question of adoption is still unresolved and the States had more power to act independently outside their own borders. The fact that this point seems hardly relevant today may actually prove him right.
  • “Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present Fœderal Government, feeble as it is…”
    • But perhaps no such war had “been occasioned” precisely because of the federal government was so “feeble.”
  • “…but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offences, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.”
    • Yes, well, his concern for the “innocent inhabitants” is touching. Perhaps he’d be willing to re-negotiate of Manhattan with those “innocent inhabitants” on more favorable terms, or give back other appropriated lands unjustly taken.
    • In any case, president Jackson would soon put the lie to this argument, nevermind the “general government”’s dealings with the “innocent inhabitants” during the course of the following century.

 

In Paragraph Fifteen, J argues that local interests might be more likely to entangle single states or regions in wars with Great Powers and that, consequently, one national government would be more likely to prevent such occurrences:

  • “The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some States, and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bordering States if any…will be most likely to direct violence, to excite war with these nations…”
    • J returns again to present real world affairs, and again – I find – his arguments are stronger for it.
  • “…and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger, as a national Government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested.”
    • That a strong central government can – and will – provide a moderating influence on local passions is almost certainly true, at least within the scope here addressed. However, when those passions become regional – e.g. slavery – a strong central government can, and will, exacerbate those passions.  But clearly the Founders/Framers were aware of this and decided to leave that particular problem for another day and another generation.

In Paragraph Sixteen, J argues that one national government will be better suited to settling (violent) disputes when they do arise:

  • “But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national Government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably.”
    • Certainly true vis-à-vis foreign affairs.
  • “The pride of States as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting or repairing their errors and offenses.”
    • An astute observation of human nature. And insofar as States are made of men, then of States as well.  Whereas one national government should (or would, J argues) dissipate such “pride” (cf. ¶11).
  • “The national Government in such cases will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and candour to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.”
    • Perhaps true in the case of local border disputes. But if the national government perceives itself wronged, surely it too is capable of (self-destructive) “pride.”  Or does this register as a “just cause” of war?

 

Paragraph Seventeen suggests that one national government will have more credibility abroad:

  • “Besides it is well known that acknowledgements, explanations and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or Confederacy of little consideration or power.”
    • Is this a ‘might makes right’ argument? Does he mean to imply that a united government can get away with more “unjust” causes of war?  Or simply that they are less likely to be persecuted, hassled, etc. if they are stronger?  That unintentional errors can be more easily forgiven?  Or perhaps even more simply that a united government is less likely to be ‘taken to the cleaners’ in any negotiation with a foreign power?

 

J continues the argument in Paragraph Eighteen, after citing the example of Genoa vis-à-vis France in 1685:

  • “Would he [Louis XIV] on any occasion either have demanded, or have received the like humiliation from Spain, Britain, or any other powerful nation?”
    • So perhaps for J, it’s just about respect and not getting ‘taken to the cleaners.’ Still, the idea that powerful nations can more or less do as they please, even unjustly, should not be overlooked.  And lest we think that modern norms or NGOs have dealt with this, we need only consider the examples of Russia in Ukraine/Crimea or North Korea’s nuclear program to see that “powerful” nations continue to have a much longer leash.

The full text of Federalist No.3 may be found here.

The Federalist Project – #2

The Federalist Project
Federalist No. 2

Jay

31 October, 1787

The second Federalist essay is composed by John Jay, who picks up the pen of Publius from Hamilton.  The main thrust of the essay is twofold.  First, to remind the reader that the Union (almost always capitalized) is of vital, even existential, importance.  And second, that it is the proposed constitution on which the fate of the Union hinges; that the constitution is the only thing that will guarantee its survival.  As in my previous essay, we will proceed through his arguments paragraph by paragraph, beginning with the first:

  • “…a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most important, that ever engaged their [i.e. ‘the people of America’] attention…”
    • “one of”: J goes on to compare it to the importance of the question of ’76 and of adopting The Articles of Confederation. Already, this seems to differ from H, who presents the question as not just of being THE question for Americans, but indeed as of being of global importance (cf. Fed.1, par.1).
  • “…the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious view of it, will be evident.”
    • Again, his language is not nearly as strong as H’s.

 

Paragraph Two:

  • “Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of Government…”
    • J begins with premises that everyone can agree on, striking a moderate and rational tone. He continues…
  • “…and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers.”
    • This is straight out of Rousseau (du Contrat Social).
    • It is also a rhetorical choice. He is forcing people to concede at an early state – of the essay and of the series – that the government must have some powers; that we do not live in a ‘state of nature.’
  • “…whether it would conduce more to the interests of the people of America, that they should, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one fœderal Government, than that they should divide themselves into separate confederacies…”
    • It is only at this point that J introduces the main theme of the essay.

 

In Paragraph Three, Jay deals for the first time with the opposition:

  • “It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion, that the prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly united…”
    • Appealing to ‘received and uncontradicted opinion’ strikes me as a weak argument. Perhaps it is no weaker than ‘nothing is more certain’ or ‘equally undeniable’ (cf. 2.1).  But in the former cases, he speaks to questions which have already been decided.
  • “…and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest Citizens have been constantly directed to that object.”
    • And now, the appeal to authority (the first of several) – ‘the best and wisest.’ In other words, people better and smarter than you think this – who are you to argue?  This also strikes me as not the best argument.
  • “But Politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is erroneous…”
    • The contrast between ‘Citizens’ and ‘Politicians’ cannot be missed nor overstated. The former put country ahead of personal interest; the latter do not.
  • “…and certain characters who were much opposed to it [i.e. ‘division’] formerly, are at present of the number [of advocates of division].”
    • To my eye, in 2017, this essentially reads as “beware of flip-floppers.”
  • “…it certainly would not be wise of the people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully convinced that they are founded in truth and sound Policy.”
    • In contrast to H’s use of ‘truth’ (cf. Fed.1), J pairs it with ‘good Policy.’ I’m not yet sure what this contrast means, but I feel sure it is not insignificant.
    • In any case, H argues that ‘motive’ is not nearly as important as ‘truth’ and ‘sound Policy.’ J seems more ready to equate them.

 

Paragraph Four is a description of America and the subsequent advantages bestowed by ‘Providence’ when the country is considered as one whole.  These include:

  • “…a variety of soils and productions…”
  • “…watered […] with innumerable streams…”
    • All of which exist “for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants.”
  • “…a succession of navigable rivers…[which form] a kind of chain around the borders…”
  • “…the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient distances…”
    • which “present them [i.e. ‘the inhabitants’] with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities.”

For J, this is no accident.  He notes:

  • “Independent America [is] composed…of one connected, fertile, wide spreading country…the portion of our western sons of liberty.”
    • The term ‘sons of liberty’ seems an intentional effort to harken back to the pre-revolutionary period and the banding together of the colonies in opposition to perceived British tyranny. However, I’m not sure what to make of limiting the term with ‘western.’  Unless he sees the Brits – with Magna Carta, etc. – as the original ‘sons of liberty’ and seeks to draw a line there.  But whether the notion of the Brits as ‘sons of liberty’ as a phrase/idea with any currency at the time, I have no idea.
    • Of note also, is his use of ‘portion.’ Certainly, it can simply mean one’s share of the division of a whole.  But in classical mythology, one’s portion is very often a function of Fate.  Indeed, the Greek word for fate – μοῖρα – derives from the verb μείρεσθαι – “take/receive one’s share/due; divide” (LSJ).  In any case, he is more explicit in the next sentence:
  • “Providence has in a particular manner blessed it (with a variety of soils, etc.)…”
    • So the nature and composition of the land are down to Providence. Does this tie in to ‘portion’?  Is it by divine workings that it is the ‘western sons of liberty’ who have received these lands?  I think that’s how we have to understand it.  Certainly this was a notion that had currency among more than a few of the Founders.

Ultimately, although he paints a pretty picture amd makes mention of ‘delight,’ his argument is, at heart, an economic one, and to a lesser extent, one of national security, insofar as the rivers provide “a kind of chain round its borders.”  (Though, perhaps strangely, he makes no mention of the vast ocean that separates America from meddling Europe).

 

In Paragraph Five, J praises the makeup of the American body-politic, in ways that, in 2017, you’re either going to love or hate.

  • “…Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to…”
    • No longer splitting hairs. We’re still a ways away yet from Manifest Destiny, further still form American Exceptionalism.  But the idea, in some form, was always present, it seems.
  • “…to one united people, a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attracted to the same philosophy of government, very similar in their manners and customs…”
    • This is a mixed bag, to say the least. On the one hand, we can see the roots of some of the very ugly ‘white nationalism’ currently afflicting us today.  But I wonder if that is reading it out of context.  Though certainly not to so homogeneous as J paints it, America had yet to experience the myriad waves of immigration from a multitude of nations that would follow in the succeeding centuries.  On the other hand, there were of course already Catholics and Jews in the country; to say nothing of (non-voting) Blacks and women.
    • That said, “attached to the same principles of government” is surely the key point here (though maybe that’s also a modern reading?). But this – and to a lesser extent, assimilation of language and culture – is what would bind those future heterogeneous peoples together.
  • “…and who, by their joint counsels, arms and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established their general Liberty and Independence.”
    • An appeal to the strength – and previous success – of unity.

 

Paragraph Six continues the appeal to unity:

  • “This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient…”
    • ‘Providence’ again. And now the word ‘inheritance.’  Which strikes me as a bit odd.  In the preceding paragraph, it was hard won through “bloody war.”  Now it is an “inheritance.”  I suppose thre are biblical grounds for being ‘given’ something by God/Providence and still having to fight for it.  (I’m thinking of the Israelites returning to the ‘promised land’ and having to take it by force).  And then again of sons of kings warring with each other for the crown of England; their ‘inheritance.’  But there is definitely a ‘chosen people’ vibe here, to my eye.
  • “…should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous and alien sovereignties.”
    • J does not leave open the possibility that separate sovereignties could be successful. If they split, he argues, this is how it will be.

 

Paragraph Seven continues the “e uno unum” theme:

  • “Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and denominations of men among us.”
    • Compared with ¶5: same ancestors, language, religion, etc. To what “orders and denominations” does he refer then?  Surely not class, with suffrage being at this time so limited.  I can only imagine he means political “orders and denominations.”  But even then, in ¶5, he also says, “attached to the same principles of government.”  Indeed, in the very next sentence of ¶7, he says:
  • “To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people…” and
  • “…each individual citizen every where enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protections.”
    • Is it even worth pointing out the obvious, that this excludes, Blacks, women, non-landowners, Indians, etc.?
  • “As a nation we have:
    • “vanquished our enemies…
    • “formed alliances and made treaties…
    • “and entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign States.”
      • “As a nation” – I take this to mean as 13 united States; or else as a collection of only those making decisions as a Continental Congress, etc. For clearly, huge parts of this “nation” are excluded from the process.  But again, if the argument here is for unity (and adoption), I take “nation” in the broadest possible sense of ‘the States.’  That is to say, not as New Yorkers or Virginians, but as Americans.

 

In Paragraph Eight, J proceeds from the more general concepts of ‘unity’ and “nation” to the narrower concept of “Union.”

  • “A strong sense of the value and blessings of Union induced the people, at a very early period, to institute a Fœderal Government to preserve and perpetuate it.”
    • It’s not hard to feel like J is sort of writing his own history here. Jamestown, 1607; Plymouth, 1620.  It was a rather long time before anybody was thinking about “Union.”  Unless he’s strictly counting from the 1770’s; which he may be…
  • “They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence…”
    • e. a “political existence” separate from England. For of course, the colonists had political existence of a sort – with their own legislatures – well before the Revolution.  But he proceeds to narrow his argument further:
  • “…at a time, when their habitations were in flames, when many of their Citizens were bleeding…:”
    • Very well then. This “very early period,” this point of “political existence,” is no earlier than the war.  He then proceeds to an apology of sorts for the Articles and the present government:
  • “It is not to be wondered at that a Government instituted in times so auspicious, should on experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.”
    • So basically, despite the “strong sense of the value and blessings of Union,” present from the point of “political existence” or a “very early period,” they essentially knocked together a not-very-good system on the fly and under pressure; and it really wasn’t very good at all; and this was to be expected!

 

Paragraph Nine serves to introduce the Constitutional Convention:

  • “This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. …they, as with one voice, convened the late Convention at Philadelphia, to take that important subject under consideration.”
    • Again, playing fast and loose with the facts (as I read it). The convention was extra-legal and held behind closed doors.  It could hardly be – I think – said to be called for “with one voice.”  Perhaps I myself am not so well versed in the history as I ought to be, but this seems an over-happy and over-simplified version of events.  If it was as J paints it, I think, ratification would be a fait accompli and there would hardly be any need for the Federalist papers.
  • “…and being persuaded that ample security for both [union and liberty], could only be found in a national Government more wisely framed…”
    • No doubt; but attributing this an “intelligent people” speaking “as if with one voice” seems rather a stretch.

 

Paragraph Ten brings more whitewashing and edge-smoothing:

OF those involved:

  • “…men who possessed the confidence of the people…”
  • …and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue and wisdom…”
  • “…without having been awed by power, or influenced by any passions except love for their Country…”

OF the circumstances:

  • “In the mild season of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects…”

OF the manner:

  • “…they passed many months in cool uninterrupted and daily consultation…”
  • “…the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous counsels.”
    • “Cool” is an interesting choice of word. The meaning is clear, but we know it was hot as hell, all the more so with the doors and windows shut to preserve secrecy.  In any case, the idea that the debates were cool and dispassionate rather than (at least at times) heated and contentious is hard to swallow.
    • “Very unanimous” – the lady doth protest too much, methinks. Anyway, we know, e.g., that of the New York delegation, only H was in favor of it.  And as for the “one voice,” we know, e.g. that governor Clinton (NY) was opposed.  So J is really painting a rather rosy – and not all that accurate – picture here.  But then, the proceedings were closed and M’s journals not yet published, so he can – at least to a certain degree – get away with it.  Synchronically, anyway.  Diachronically, this argument doesn’t really stand the test of time, in my opinion.

 

Paragraph Eleven seeks again to undermine the opposition by attacking their motives:

  • “…this plan is only recommended, not imposed…[recommended] to that sedate and candid consideration, which the magnitude and importance of the subject demand…”
    • Like H, a call for calm and rational discussion.
  • “Experience on a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. …yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the Press began to teem with Pamphlets and weekly Papers against those very measures [i.e. the measures ‘recommended’ by the “Memorable Congress of 1774”].
    • A perhaps not unironic argument given that this is the very method Publius utilizing to remonstrate for adoption. In other words, ‘Don’t trust the Press…but these “Pamphlets and weekly Papers” are alright.’
  • “Not only many of the Officers of Government who obeyed the dictates of personal interest, but others from mistaken estimates of consequences, or under the influence of former attachments, on whose ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond to the public good, were indefatigable in their endeavours to persuade the people to reject the advice of that Patriotic Congress.”
    • This seems in direct contradiction to H’s call not to impugn the motives of the opposition, who admitted of “sources, blameless at least, if not respectable,” and “good and wise men of the wrong as well as of the right side of questions” (1.4).
    • Furthermore, by casting the Congress as “Patriotic,” he implies that any opposition is necessarily unpatriotic. This, to me, is an ugly strain of political discourse, which continues to this very day.

 

Paragraph Twelve reads like a veritable hosanna to the “Memorable Congress of 1774”:

  • “…wise and experienced…”
  • “…bringing a variety of useful information…” from “…different parts of the country…”
  • “…enquiring into and discussing the true interests of their country…” having “…acquired very accurate knowledge on that head.”
  • “…individually interested in the public liberty and prosperity…”
  • “…not less their inclination, than their duty, to recommend only such measures, as after the most mature deliberation they really thought prudent and advisable.”
    • To borrow from the film Amadeus, he makes them sound as if they “shit marble.”

 

Paragraph Thirteen is an appeal to the authority of the Framers:

  • “…it is well known that some of the most distinguished members of that Congress, who have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring political information, were also members of this convention and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experience.”
    • In other words, ‘If you can’t approve the constitution on its own merits, take it on faith in those who drafted it.’ Or, more cynically, ‘Who are you to take up a position against men of such intellect and character?’  Or, at the very least, ‘You can’t possibly prefer the judgment of the opposition to that of the Framers.’

 

The Fourteenth and final Paragraph returns again to the praise of Union:

  • “…the prosperity of America depends[s] on its Union.”
    • Union above all else. This is the thrust of the closing argument.
    • No attempt is made, as yet, to address the particular merits of the proposed constitution, or even to show how it would guarantee Union; it is simply implied that those opposed would “[suggest] that three or four confederacies would be better than one.”
  • “I am persuaded in my own mind, that the people have always thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform attachment to the cause of the Union, rests on great and weighty reasons…”
    • J seems always comfortable in asserting the will and wishes of “the people,” and always in terms of unanimity and without dissent. This is what “the people” want, he seems to say, and those opposed are not of the people.
  • “…I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good Citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim in the words of the Poet, “FAREWELL, A LONG FAREWELL, TO ALL MY GREATNESS.”
    • The quote is from Henry VIII, 3.2.351.

 

Closing Remarks:

To my eye, J isn’t half the writer that H is.  His arguments are starker, less nuanced, and he more readily ascribes malignant intent to the opposition.  He sees “Patriots” and enemies.  He too easily ascribes unanimity both to the Framers and “the people,” the latter of which he too easily claims to speak for in their entirety.  He also points to the homogeneity of race and religion as virtues, in a way that is uncomfortable to the (or, at least, this) modern eye.  Nevertheless, he is devoted to the cause of Union, which, at the time, was of prime importance, and in whose name, at least one odious compromise would be made.

The full text of Federalist No.2 may be found here.

The Federalist Project – #1

A brief word, as this is the first post in my series on the Federalist Papers, which I’ve previously outlined here.  Going forward, I’ll simply post these as I finish them, with no extra commentary.  Those who are interested will read them, those who are not are free to skip them.  I’ve not yet settled on a format.  For this first post, I’ve decided to go with a sort of outline/bullet point style.  To this end, I welcome any feedback regarding style, organization, clarity, etc.  I also welcome any debate with regard to my analyses, limited though they be.
–DES, 7/28/17, Berlin

The Federalist Project
Federalist No. 1

Hamilton

27 October, 1787

The first Federalist essay goes to Alexander Hamilton, and we essentially begin in medias res, with the self-evidently failing Articles of Confederation, which he refers to as the “inefficiency of the subsisting Fœderal Government.”1  For him, the importance of the proposed constitution is also self-evident.  Its consequences include:

  • “Nothing less than the existence of the Union…”
    • We read later that the “Union” is hardly to be taken for granted. This is, after all, the time of “The United States are” and not “The United States is.”
  • “…the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed…”
  • “…the fate of an empire…”
    • My initial impression was that this was a most remarkable choice of words. We must ask, I think, whether seeing America as a nascent “empire” is a particularly Hamiltonian vision.  Do opponents see, or even want, this?  But we must also ask if H. even uses the word as we understand it today.  Later usages of “empire” in this essay may shed some light on this; but I will deal with them as they arise.
  • “…, in many respects, the most interesting [empire] in the world.”
    • A common view among many of the “Founders,” to be sure; what we today might call “American Exceptionalism.”

He continues:

“…it seems to be reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force.”

  • “…to the people of this country…”, “…reserved…”
    • Though he doesn’t use the word, he surely makes reference here to “Providence,” a favorite theme of the “Founders.”
  • “…by their conduct and example…”
    • Presumably the Revolution and the principles thereof. Otherwise, what can he mean by conduct and example?
  • “…capable…of establishing good government from reflection and choice…”
    • He presents the situation as unique and unprecedented, as I read it; though whether this is true is debatable. Though direct democracy on the Athenian model was not much in favor, they did seem to have a reverence for the Roman Republic.  Was this, at least for a time, not “good government from reflection and choice?”
  • “…on accident and force.”
    • Force is obvious. Of what he has in mind by accident, I am less certain.  Though I might hazard to guess: The chance or accident of having a good king or bad.  But this is not quite the “question” of the constitution.

He concludes the first paragraph with strong words indeed:

  • “…a wrong election…may…deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.”
    • In other words, the scope of the choice goes far beyond the borders of the state (i.e. New York), or even the country.

 

The second paragraph sets up the questions of interest and motive as well as the way in which the question ought to be approached.

  • “This will add to the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism…”
    • In other words, don’t just do this for your country, but for all humanity!
  • “…unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good…more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected.
    • A dose of realism.

He then proceeds to a bit of warning, noting that “The plan…affects too many interests,” among which may be counted:

  • “…innovations upon too many local institutions…”
    • This is an older usage of innovate, which here means: to “make changes to anything established.”2
  • “…not to involve…a variety a variety of objects foreign to its merits…”
    • Introducing the question of interest, to be dealt with more fully in the next paragraph.
  • “…and the vices, passions and prejudices3 little favorable to the discovery of truth.”
    • Hamilton’s truth, surely.
    • Introducing the notion that the question should be dealt with rationally and not emotionally (to be dealt with fully in paragraph four).

 

Paragraph three, then, address interest and motive.  Indeed, he argues that “Among the most formidable of the obstacles [will be] the interests of:

  • “…a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument and consequence of the offices they hold under the State-establishments…”
    • For H., there always was and always will be an entrenched class who seek to preserve, or even grow, their own power/wealth at the expense of the state; an argument which I find no less true today. That he speaks here of emolument, is striking, to say the least.
  • “…and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country…”
    • Some things never change…
  • “…or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies, than from its union under one government.”
    • Frighteningly prescient, especially with regard to his choice of the word confederacies – though perhaps this word was not so freighted in 1787. But more on this later.
    • Empire But here it seems fairly innocuous and hardly seems as though it should be taken with the modern usage; however striking it might have seemed in paragraph one.  Perhaps it is best to read it as a simple 1:1 translation of Latin imperium.4  Still, it will be interesting to note if/how Madison &/or Jay use this word.  And also to remember that some would later see H. as having ambition of becoming an “American Napoleon,” due in large part to his desire for (and to lead) a standing army.5

 

In paragraph four, he calls for an enlightened and rational debate on the subject:

  • “…it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition…will spring rom sources, blameless at least, if not respectable, the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears.”
    • An admirable – if merely rhetorical – show of respect for the opposition; and sorely lacking from today’s discourse, I might add.
  • “…that we upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as the right side of questions, of the first magnitude to society.”
    • A fair bit of caution…
  • “And a further reason for caution…we are not always sure, that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives, not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as upon those who oppose the right side of a question.”
    • At first, this seems reasonable and moderate. Yet he never actually admits that his position might be the wrong one.  Note the use of truth and the right side of a question.
  • “Were there not even these inducements to moderation…”
    • The second time he uses the word moderation. seeks moderation as the mode of discourse, but not that it might lead to an opposing conclusion.  Only as a strategy, only as the best way to convince people of the truth, as we see in the closing of the paragraph:
  • “Nothing could be more ill judged than that intolerant spirit, which has, at all times, characterized political parties.”
  • “For, in politics as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.”
    • Man, this guy can write! But we might add that in politics as in religion, for H. as for so many others throughout history, there is only one truth.  All that remains is how to convert people from wrong to right; the question of wrong and right having already been decided.

 

H. begins paragraph five with a few more words against passion:

  • “…it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torment of angry and malignant passions will be let loose…”
    • At no time, apparently, did (popular) politics not bring out the worst in people.
  • “…hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations, and by the bitterness of their invectives.”
    • One might be tempted to see here a parallel with right wing talk radio, &c.

The rest of the paragraph is largely an (elegant) warning against δημηγορία, demagoguery.  But first follows a defense of “energetic” and “efficient” government in a very abstract way.  And even then, it is more of a defense – or even a counterattack – against the sorts of arguments to be encountered, rather than a defense of the thing per se:

  • “An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized, as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty.”
  • “It will be forgotten…that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is too apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust.”
  • “…it will be equally forgotten, that the vigour of government is essential to the security of liberty…”
    • Though this argument can surely be used to defend nearly any position, the Trump DoJ comes to mind in 2017. Though this could just as easily be used, I suppose, to defend Trump’s executive orders regarding immigration, &c.  On the flip side, the New Deal/Great Society readings are self-evident.
  • “…a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people, than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government.
    • This can only be read, I think, as an attack on populism. However, I doubt he ever had in mind the sort of populism which calls for, among other things, universal health care; surely an example of “energetic” government.  In any case, with this, he transitions to his warning against δημηγορία.
  • “History will teach us, that the former [i.e. zeal for the rights of the people] has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism, than the latter [i.e. zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government], and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics the greatest number have begun their career, by paying an obsequious court to the people, commencing Demagogues and ending Tyrants.”
    • For H. and the “Founders,” presumably Caesar was most prominent; but also surely Cleon, inter alia. Reading this today, I think first of Erdogan, but also of Putin, Hitler, Stalin…and not a little bit of Trump.
    • “By paying an obsequious court to the people” stands out to me as a particularly sharp turn of phrase.

 

In paragraph six, H. urges caution against all arguments but those “which may result from the evidence of truth.”   But here, finally, he openly admits that he has already made up his mind:

  • “I am convinced, that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness.”6
    • Liberty and happiness, yes. But dignity is an interesting choice, and I must confess I’m not entirely clear what he means by it here, except perhaps that he sees the proposed form of government as the most “dignified” yet proposed by man.  But that is, at present, only speculation.
  • “I effect not reserves, which I do not feel.” “The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity.”
    • This is how you say, “I know I’m right,” with class and eloquence.
  • “My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast: My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all.”
    • On keeping his own motives private: On the one hand, he warns against all foul manner of motivation on both sides of the question. Should we not know his, that we need not fear he will personally profit by adoption?  On the other, he has made clear that motivation is not at issue – the only thing that matters is getting to the “truth.”
    • I love the construction: “something may be judged of by somebody.” It’s archaic, but it’s also kind of gorgeous.

 

In paragraph seven, he simply lists the topics that he plans to address in the course of the Federalist.  By the very names of the topics, he gives indication that they are all to the good and by the very merits of their names, argue for adoption from a position of already having been decided [i.e. being self-evidently “true”].

If this [i.e. paragraph seven] is not enough, he will also seek to “answer all the objections…that may seem to have any claim to your attention” in paragraph eight.  He does seem to recognize that simply laying out his own arguments, no matter how elegant and exact (and “true”), may not be enough.  I personally doubt that H. thinks there can be any objection that might fairly have a claim to anyone’s attention.  Nevertheless, he knows that such objections are out there and will, apparently, meet them head on.

He closes Federalist No.1 with this ninth and final paragraph, in which he argues for the “utility of the UNION”:

  • “…the utility of the UNION…which it may be imagined has no adversaries.”
    • It is not just a question, then, of the type of government, but of the very Union itself. In theory, one could support the Union as prescribed by the Articles of Confederation and still oppose the constitution.  And surely he means this to an extent.  But he goes further:
  • “But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new constitution, that the Thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system…”
    • Interestingly, this is not an argument we ever hear today, even in the context of “states rights” or a too-powerful federal government. I’m not even sure it was still relevant by the time of the Civil War.  But it was certainly a concern at the time, even amongst the Founders.  He continues:
  • “…and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.”
    • To the modern eye, the word “confederacies” is striking, if not outright alarming, and seems to lend a certain perspicacity to H.’s words. But I think it should not be so.  Small-“c” confederacy obviously predates The Confederacy.  Indeed, the nation was already operating under the Articles of Confederation.  And yet, this is exactly what would happen.  And while the reason would not be the size and power of the federal government per se, it is that which would underlie the question of slavery to a great degree; and from the Southern perspective, more so than any question of right/wrong vis-à-vis that awful institution.
  • “…the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution, or a dismemberment of the Union.”
    • These, and nothing less, are the stakes.
  • “…begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed by its dissolution.”
    • This will “constitute the subject of [his] next address.”

 

PUBLIUS: All essays are signed with this name.  H/M/J speak with one voice.  But whereas today we might take a dim view of anonymity in such writings, I think here the idea is, the arguments stand on their own merits and need not the endorsements of their authors’ names; though I think the authorship was no secret.7  But we should also remember that this was a common practice of the time, and on all sides; the opposition signing essays as “Cato” and the like.

 

The full text of Federalist No.1 may be found here.

  1. I preserve the original spellings and punctuation as reproduced in the Bantam edition of 1982, edited by Gary Wills. []
  2. dictionary.com []
  3. No fan of the Oxford Comma was Hamilton.  #myboy []
  4. Lewis & Short give the following: B.1: supreme power, sovereignty, sway, dominion, empire; b) dominion, government; (a). dominion, realm, empire; 3.(g). the government. []
  5. I’d dig through Chernow’s book for a better citation here, but alas, it is in NY. []
  6. Wait, now an Oxford Comma?  #wtf []
  7. I could be wrong about this. []

The Federalist Project

The Federalist Project
Introduction

For the usual readers of this blogue, who are accustomed to finding here either stories about my travels and experiences or the odd bit of silly fiction, a few words of explanation are probably in order.  The following will be the first in a series of short postings about a collection of documents generally referred to as The Federalist or The Federalist Papers, a group of essays written in the late 18th century to defend, and to argue for the ratification of, the United States constitution.  I shall give my reasons for embarking upon this new series of posts shortly.  Suffice it to say, this subject matter may not be for everybody.  If that should be you, do feel free to skip the rest of this post as well as any future posts with the word “Federalist” in the title.

Right.  So why do this at all?  Well, if you haven’t noticed, we Americans tend to be pretty proud of our constitution.  This despite the fact that no two people seem to have the same view as to what the constitution actually means.  Like the bible, people tend to find in it what they want.  The constitution itself is sparsely worded and really quite short.  And, generally, it must be taken together with its first ten amendments, known collectively as the Bill of Rights.

And while today, the ratification of the constitution is generally seen as a fait accompli, back in 1789, it was no sure thing.  The people, or rather the several states, needed to be convinced of it.  After all, at the time of its drafting, the United States were operating under a different charter, the Articles of Confederation.  Indeed, there was no legal provision for ditching the Articles and starting over with a new constitution.  This made the constitution itself, if not an illegal charter, an extra-legal one.  That is, it was born outside of the existing body of laws.

The deal was, if any nine of the original thirteen states agreed to make the switch, then the Articles would become null and void and the new constitution would take effect.  But as I said, the states needed convincing, and some more than others.  None more so, apparently, than New York.  Because even back then, what’s America without New York?

In any case, New York was iffy, at best, at the outset.  How then to convince the Empire State?  The answer came in the form of 85 essays, published between October 1787 and May 1788.  The essays would serve two main purposes.  The first was simply to allay fears that the new proposed federal government would be too powerful, at the expense of the states.1  The second was to explain the purpose and meaning of the constitution; something which the constitution itself noticeably does not do.

And who was behind this effort?  Well, it was primarily the work of two men.  One was the very “father of the constitution” himself, Virginian and fourth president, James Madison.  The other, of course, was that brilliant – and lately quite popular – New Yorker, Alexander Hamilton.  Of the 85 essays, Hamilton wrote fully 51 of them to Madison’s 29.  John Jay, first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, also a New Yorker, wrote the remaining five.

Most American students will have at least learned of the Federalist in high school social studies class.  We learn, roughly, of the role they played in getting the constitution ratified.  We may also learn that they are still read today by constitutional scholars and lawyers, especially when the constitutionality of a given law comes before the Supreme Court.  We may even have read, perhaps in college, selected essays; or at least parts of essays.2  But I suspect that very few of us who do not go into careers as constitutional scholars or lawyers have read them in their entirety.

And yet, they are often in the news.  As I just mentioned, when a new law is argued in front of the Supreme Court, the relevant essay might be trotted out for public consumption.  When it is suggested that president Trump may be doing some thing (or, let’s face it, many things) that were never intended by “the Founders,”3 some or other Federalist argument is often presented to make the case.

Which brings me to this, my so-called Federalist Project.  My goal is to read each of the 85 essays in their turn and to publish a short blogue post in reaction.  I shall do my best not to bring any personal ideology to this project, to not inject my own opinions into these posts; though, on some level, that is surely impossible.  I simply wish to read them and to understand them.

To the extent that I am able, I wish to do this both diachronically and synchronically.  In other words, I wish to understand them as best I can both in terms of how they read today but also in the context of their own times.  In the case of the former, though I shall try my hardest, I suspect it will be impossible to leave my own views at the door.  As for the latter, I shall surely make errors in my knowledge of history.  I beg forgiveness in advance for both of these inevitable failings.

I set no specific timetable for the completion of this project.  That said, I will hope to tackle at least one or two essays each month.  Even at that pace, it will take me upwards of four years to finish this.  But what’s the rush.  These documents have been around for more than two-hundred years.  And I’ve so far gone thirty-six without reading them.  So it will take as much time as it takes.

As for the text, I will be working from the Bantam edition, published in 1982 with an introduction and commentary by Gary Wills.4  Direct quotations will be taken from this source.  That said, The Federalist Papers are obviously in the public domain.  And so, I will add a link in each post to the relevant essay in order that the interested reader (if he or she should exist) may read the document for themselves, stripped of my own opinions and necessarily cherry-picked quotations.

We Americans love our constitution.  Yet often, I fear we are over-proud and under-learned of it.  In the course of this endeavor, I hope to come to know our national charter more intimately, to better understand what is at the very heart of American political identity.  I hope, too, that some of you will choose to join me on this journey; will argue with me when you don’t agree; will set me right where I am wrong.  In these times of sound-bites and growing ignorance, we could all do with a little more learning, a little more thought.  Let this be a small step towards those ends.

  1. Remember, we had just revolted from monarchical England. []
  2. Madison’s discussion of ‘faction’ in No. 10, for example. []
  3. I’ve put “the Founders” in quotes because I think it’s ridiculous that we refer to them as one block of people, as if they all shared the same views and opinions.  They most certainly did not. []
  4. On a personal note, I ordered this book from Amazon way back in 2001, while I was studying early American history in college.  (I did my senior thesis – which was not at all good – on Hamilton, Adams and the Federalist party).  Anyway, years later, I was looking over my purchase history and discovered that I’d ordered the book on September 11, 2001.  I surely didn’t go shopping that day, so I can only assume it was sometime after midnight of the 10th.  Still, that’s always struck me as an eerie coincidence of history, as a serious dose of jingoistic patriotism was on the very verge of being ginned up… []